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VOLUNTARY RECAPITALIZATIONS,
FAIRNESS, AND RULE 10b-5: LIFE ALONG
THE TRAIL OF SANTA FE
By RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
In corporate recapitalizations, the board of directors will
sometimes propose a recapitalization plan which substan-
tially alters the "bundle of rights" represented by preferred
shares. Although these plans cannot usually be completed
without the approval of a majority of the preferred sharehold-
ers, the preferred shareholders are at a disadvantage to pro-
tect their interests for several reasons. Thus preferred share-
holders who are dissatisfied with the change in their rights
will sometimes call upon state courts to enjoin the recapitali-
zation on the grounds that it is unfair or fraudulent; state
courts, however, have provided only slight protection for pre-
ferred shareholders. In this article, Professor Campbell exam-
ines the possibility of protecting preferred shareholders by
applying rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
recapitalizations. He concludes that rule 10b-5 provides sub-
stantial protection to shareholders whose rights are altered in
a recapitalization.
INTRODUCTION
A corporation's common shareholders often find it advan-
tageous to alter the contractual rights of the corporation's pre-
ferred shareholders.' This may involve a change in dividend
rights, liquidation preferences, redemption provisions, conver-
sion rights or any other right enjoyed by the preferred share-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Centre College;
J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
The author would like to acknowledge Robert W. Griffith and Jennifer B. Coffman
for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
I One commentator found 34 alterations of preferred shareholders' rights in a
study of 79 preferred stocks over a 20-year period from 1932 to 1951. Conrad,
Manipulation of Share Priorities, 8 VAND. L. Rav. 55, 57 (1954). Although one may be
inclined to view the alteration of the preferred shareholder contract as a phenomenon
of the 1940's, cases still arise with some frequency. See, e.g., Gruss v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 534 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1976); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I.,
249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
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holders. 2 Alternatively, there could be a substitution of an en-
tirely new security for the existing preferred share.
Perhaps the most typical situation (or at least the situa-
tion that has attracted the most attention) involves a company
with a cumulative preferred stock that has arrearages.3 If that
company has a change in fortune and begins to generate earn-
ings, the arrearages will constrain the payment of dividends to
the common shareholders, since the preferred shareholders'
contract requires the payment of arrearages before common
shareholders are entitled to any dividend. In this situation the
board of directors, which is typically elected by (and therefore
representative of) the common shareholders, will sometimes
propose a "recapitalization" of the corporation with the usual
result that the preferred shareholders receive a new "bundle of
rights" in substitution of their former rights (including the
accumulated arrearages). The preferred shareholder could re-
ceive a new common stock or a new preferred stock with altered
liquidation, dividend, conversion or redemption rights.4
There are a number of methods available to the corpora-
tion that wishes to alter the rights of its preferred shareholders.
The most direct is an amendment to the articles of incorpora-
tion changing the "preferences, limitations, and . . . relative
rights of the preferred shareholders." 5 Another method involves
2 In describing the right to alter shareholders' rights by an amendment to the
articles of incorporation, § 58(g) of the Model Business Corporation Act permits an
alteration in the "preferences, limitations, and the relative rights" of shares. MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 58(g) (1974 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as MBCA].
3 Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d
701 (3d Cir. 1944); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (I1. 1949); State v.
Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Dratz v. Occi-
dental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35
A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), affl'd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co.,
19 A.2d 820 (N.J. Ch. 1940); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249
A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
1 For a discussion of the various problems associated with these alterations see
Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends, 49 MICH. L. REv. 363, 565 (1951); Becht,
Corporate Charter Amendments: Issues of Prior Stock and the Alteration of Dividend
Rates, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1950); Becht, Changes in the Interests of Classes of
Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendments Reducing Capital, and Altering Re-
demption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1950).
5 MBCA § 58(g) (1971) authorizes such alterations. This method was used in
Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), affl'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944);
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d
[Vol. 66
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the use of a "dummy" corporation; the existing corporation
incorporates a new company and effects a merger of the old
company into the newly formed company, exchanging a new
and different security for the old preferred stock.' The result is
the same whichever mechanism is used: The contractual rights
of the preferred shareholders are altered.
Although these alterations usually cannot be completed
without the approval of a majority of the preferred sharehold-
ers,7 the preferred shareholders sometimes will invoke the eq-
uity power of state courts to enjoin the recapitalization, claim-
ing that it was "unfair" or "fraudulent" with respect to them.
However, the protection afforded the preferred shareholders in
these suits where they have attempted to enforce some equita-
ble constraint has been slight indeed. Courts, relying more on
political predilection than analysis, have persistently rambled
through the recapitalization cases, often without defining the
equitable norms that constrain recapitalizations.' Even in
cases applying a defined norm, the analysis is consistently in-
adequate The analysis often consists of a listing of the pre-
853 (Iowa 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 64
A.2d 644 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J.
Ch.), affl'd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J.
Ch. 1943), affl'd, 35 A.2d 894 (N.J. 1944).
6 This technique was used in Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich.
1949); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969);
Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
E.g., MBCA § 60 (1974) requires class voting when the amendment to the arti-
cles of incorporation alters the rights of preferred shareholders. Also, under the sections
governing mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets, shareholders whose rights are
altered are entitled to class voting. Id. at §§ 73, 79.
In Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 64 A.2d 644 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1949) the court
spoke of both "unfairness" and "bad faith" as norms applicable to a recapitalization.
At another point, however, the court stated: "The fairness or unfairness of corporation
action may not be considered where that action is in exercise of a power conferred upon
the corporation by the Act under which it was organized . . . . [The Court . . .
cannot operate to nullify the corporate power conferred by the law." Id. at 649. See
also Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944) as an example of a
case in which the court apparently was unclear as to the appropriate norm to be
applied.
I Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 886 (1945); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943),
aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Del. 1943); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1943); State v. Bechtel,
31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo
Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), affl'd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Kamena v. Janssen
Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J. Ch. 1943); Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 44
1977]
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recapitalization rights enjoyed by the shareholder and a com-
parison of those rights with the post-recapitalization rights en-
joyed by the shareholder. Then, with no attempt to quantify
the value of or the weight accorded to the particular rights
involved, the court concludes that the plan is or is not accepta-
ble.' 0
These cases have not failed to catch the eye of legal com-
mentators whose writings typically have demonstrated the dis-
advantaged position of preferred shareholders who "rebargain"
their rights." The commentators have pointed out that the
board of directors has control over the payment of dividends
and is normally composed of persons elected by the common
shareholders, that the plan of recapitalization originates with
and the timing is controlled by the common shareholders,1 2 and
that delay encountered by threatened litigation favors junior,
over senior, equity holders. 3 The commentators usually con-
clude that the power disparity between the hapless and help-
less preferred shareholders and the strong and greedy common
shareholders necessitates interposing some equitable con-
straint that limits the concessions extracted from the preferred
shareholders.' 4 In addition, the commentators often discuss
more sophisticated issues such as the measure of claims surren-
dered by the preferred shareholders, the measure of the new
rights received by the former preferred shareholders, and the
necessity (or absence thereof) for equality between the two.'
5
N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249
A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
10 Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Bowman v.
Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1959); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d
341 (Mich. 1949).
" Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to
Mirage, 57 HAnv. L. REv. 894 (1944); Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate
Changes, 1 W. RaE. L. REV. 3 (1949); Meck, Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Pre-
ferred Stocks-The Legal Doctrine, 55 HAlv. L. RaV. 71 (1941); Note, Protection for
Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 58 CoLUbi.
L. REV. 1030 (1958).
12 Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 H~Av. L. REV. 780, 791-93
(1942).
,3 Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifica-
tions, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445, 460 n.40 (1973).
" See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 12, at 817.
, Brudney, supra note 13; Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock
Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. 1, 24-51 (1942); Note, A Standard of Fairness
for Compensating Preferred Shareholders in Corporate Recapitalizations, 33 U. Cm.
L. REV. 97 (1965).
[Vol. 66
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These writings have, however, served limited purposes
only. While they provide work, intellectual stimulation and a
degree of notoriety for the authors, and further serve as re-
search tools for other persons writing in the area, the impact
of these scholarly endeavors on the courts has been slight. Es-
pecially when one considers that commentators such as Dodd,"6
Latty," Lattin8 and, of late, Brudney5 have written in this
area, the failure of courts to deal with the problem is particu-
larly unfortunate.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19340 provides preferred share-
holders who are involved in a recapitalization with more pro-
tection than can be obtained from state common law. Although
in the last few years there has been an erosion of the protection
afforded by rule 10b-5,1' this writer is convinced that the rule
applies to recapitalizations and, accordingly, requires the dis-
closure of all material information surrounding a recapitaliza-
tion. Finally, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in
the Santa Fe Industries case,2 rule 10b-5 can provide an effec-
tive constraint against an unfair recapitalization.
" Dodd, supra note 11; Dodd, supra note 12.
7 Latty, Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes in Senior
Shares, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 759 (1952); Latty, supra note 15.
, Lattin, supra note 11.
"Brudney, supra note 13.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
21 Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
Foremost McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Rbndeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Foreman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
1977]
HeinOnline  -- 66 Ky. L.J. 271 1977-1978
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
I. A SINGLE COMPANY RECAPITALIZATION AS A PURCHASE OR SALE
OF A SECURITY
In 1952 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
now-famous case of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,3 in
which it refused to extend the protection of rule 10b-5 to plain-
tiffs who were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities.24 Al-
though the tenure of Birnbaum was sometimes in doubt, 5 the
Supreme Court later decided Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,6 in which it adopted the purchaser-seller requirement
of Birnbaum. In Blue Chip the Court refused to extend the
protection of rule 10b-5 to plaintiffs who claimed they had
refrained from buying shares of the Blue Chip Stamp Company
because of material misstatements made by the company.
Thus, a recapitalization must constitute a "purchase" or
"sale" within rule 10b-5 in order for a shareholder whose rights
are altered in a recapitalization to recover under that rule.
The definitions of "purchase" 27 and "sale"8 that are con-
tained in the 1934 Act are of no assistance in deciding whether
a recapitalization falls within the constraints of rule 10b-5. The
Securities Act of 1933, however, provides authority for constru-
ing the meaning of these terms, and it appears that this author-
ity can be used as a basis for defining the limits of "purchase"
or "sale" under rule 10b-5.29 Under rule 145 of the Securities
Act of 1933, "offer" and "sale" are defined to include the sub-
mission "for the vote or consent of. . . security holders a plan
• . . for [a] reclassification of securities of such corporation
• . . , which involves the substitution of a security for another
security.""0 Thus it appears that any recapitalization signifi-
- 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
2, The court stated that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "was
directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually asso-
ciated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than fraudulent mismanagement
of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5 extended protection only to the defrauded
purchaser or seller." 193 F.2d at 464.
21 See generally Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A NetwEra for
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
28 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970) defines "purchase" to "include any contract to
buy, purchase or otherwise acquire" a security.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970) defines "sale" to "include any contract to sell or
otherwise dispose of" a security.
21 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRiTms LAW: FRAUD § 6.5(2), at 138.1, n.95 (1971).
- 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1976).
[Vol. 66
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cantly affecting the rights of shareholders is a sale of securities
under the 1933 Act and so requires registration under the
provisions of that Act. It is interesting to note that even prior
to the adoption of rule 145,31 the position of the Commission
was that such reclassifications were sales for the purposes of the
antifraud provisions .31
The 1933 Act provides still more authority for classifying
recapitalizations as sales. Section 3(a)(9) exempts from the
registration provision "[a]ny security exchanged by the issuer
with its existing security holders exclusively ....1-33 The ob-
vious inference to be drawn from this exemption is that such
exchanges involving a single corporation do involve purchases
and sales of securities within the 1933 Act; otherwise, there
would have been no need for the exemption.
Additionally, the merger cases decided under rule 10b-5
provide authority for classifying recapitalizations as purchases
or sales. Those cases have uniformly held that the shareholders
of the acquired company were purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties and, accordingly, that those shareholders were afforded the
protection of rule 10b-5 .3 This position was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.
35
It is obvious, however, that the analogy between single-
company recapitalizations and mergers involving two separate
companies is not complete. A merger affects the investment of
a shareholder in two distinct ways. First, it alters the corpora-
tion in which he has invested. Instead of owning an interest in
a company that makes tennis balls, a shareholder may end up
3, Rule 133, the "no sale" rule, was repealed by rule 145 in 1972.
32 SEC Release No. 33-3420, 1 FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) 3090.565 (Aug. 2, 1951).
One author stated that "the Commission originally believed that the 'no sale rule'
dictated a holding that mergers were outside the ambit of general anti-fraud provisions
such as Section 10(b)." Comment, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 912 (1969).
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1970).
In Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969)
the court stated: "It is no longer open to question that the exchange of shares in
connection with a merger or sale of assets constitutes a 'purchase or sale' within the
meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 1330. See also Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir.
1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton
Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
- 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
1977]
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owning an interest in a company that makes tennis balls and
coffee pots. Second, the bundle of rights represented by the
share of stock may have changed significantly. For example,
the shareholder may have had preferred stock in the acquired
company and thus was entitled to liquidation preference, divi-
dend preference, etc. His ownership in the acquiring company
may be, and often is, of a different nature. It may be in the
form of junior equity, with or without voting rights, or it may
even consist of debt securities. Thus, the shareholder's claims
against the corporation and his rights among the various inves-
tors in the corporation may be drastically changed in the
merger situation. A recapitalization, on the other hand, alters
the shareholder's rights in the second way only. He is still an
investor in the same company. It is his rights in that company
that have been changed.
Notwithstanding the fact that the analogy between merg-
ers and recapitalizations is not complete, the reasons are com-
pelling for treating the two situations similarly. In both instan-
ces shareholders are making investment decisions; by casting
their votes they are deciding whether to retain their existing
"bundle of rights." Although the alteration of the rights of a
shareholder in a merger situation includes an alteration in the
group of assets the corporation owns,36 that fact alone should
not be determinative of the existence of a "sale." Rather, one
should focus on the fact that the rights of the shareholder can
be significantly altered in both recapitalizations and mergers.
One need only read the "classic" recapitalization cases37 to
understand that shareholders are affected significantly (and
often adversely) by recapitalizations." Accordingly, those
shareholders who are required to vote for or against a proposed
recapitalization need the special fraud protection provided by
rule 10b-5.
In holding that a merger was a sale, the Seventh Circuit
stated that "the complex nature of a merger enhances the op-
portunities for fraud and this increases the need for antifraud
11 In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969) the Court stated that a
merger "resulted in their [the shareholders] losing their status as shareholders in
Producers and becoming shareholders in a new company."
7 See the cases cited supra in notes 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10.
3In 1 L. Loss, SEcuRms REGULATION 514 (student ed. 1961), the author indicates
that such alterations would be sales for purposes of the 1933 Act.
[Vol. 66
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protection." 9 Arguably, the opportunity for fraud is even
greater in recapitalization because of the usual absence of ap-
praisal rights 0 and because the realities of power and politics
of recapitalization cause preferred shareholders to be in a sig-
nificantly disadvantaged position.4"
In determining whether a recapitalization is a purchase or
sale within the meaning of rule 10b-5, one is not limited to
analogy and secondary authority (although such precedent is
most helpful), since there are a limited number of cases in
which direct consideration is given to the question of whether
a recapitalization involves a sale of securities. In one such case,
In re Penn Central Securities Litigation,4 2 the holders of Penn
Central Company (Railroad) exchanged their stock for stock in
Penn Central Holding Company (Holding), which had been
formed by shareholders in Railroad and had no assets. The
plaintiffs, shareholders in Railroad, claimed that since the re-
capitalization significantly altered their rights as shareholders,
it was a purchase or sale of a security. The plaintiffs empha-
sized that the recapitalization had changed their preemptive
rights, cumulative voting rights, and the par value of their
stock. 3
The district court held that the "reorganization [did] not
constitute a purchase or sale under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1967).
0 Under the Model Act, appraisal rights are available only for mergers, consolida-
tions and sales of assets. MBCA § 73 (1974). If, of course, the recapitalization were
effected by a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets with a "shell corporation" (i.e., a
corporation with no assets), appraisal rights would be available.
42 See Brudney, supra note 13.
,2 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affl'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
Plaintiffs claimed the followifig differences between the Railroad and Holding
stock:
(1) Railroad stock consisted of one class . . . while Holding Co.'s articles
.. .provide for two classes [one of which was preferred] . . .. The creation
of authorized preference stock placed the common stockholders of Holding
Co. in a lower priority classification. . .. (2) Railroad stock had preemptive
rights which Holding Co. common stock does not. (3) Railroad's capital stock
account was carried at $10 per share while the common stock of Holding Co.
is carried at a stated value of $1 per share. (4) Common stockholders of
Holding Co. are entitled to cumulative voting in the election of directors
while the stockholders of Railroad did not have this right. (5) Holding Co.
has fewer classes of and a shorter term of office for directors than did rail-
road.
347 F. Supp. at 1337.
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' . ."N' because the changes were merely "internal corporate
action" that "could have been accomplished by amending the
articles of incorporation . . . . "' The court stated that "such
internal corporate action has never been considered to fall
within the statutory coverage of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5."46 The
court distinguished the reorganization from the typical merger
(which the court recognized was subject to rule 10b-5) by stat-
ing:
For the purposes of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the critical char-
acteristic of a traditional merger is the combination of assets
of two corporate structures and the resulting change in stock-
holders' interests. Internal corporate changes alone cannot
accomplish the same alteration in the nature of the corporate
entity and the stockholders' interest.47
The plaintiffs changed their emphasis on appeal to the
Third Circuit" and claimed that the transaction was within
rule 10b-5 because the reorganization resulted in the loss of
their appraisal rights, obstructed their ability to intervene in
the bankruptcy proceedings of Railroad, and permitted diversi-
fication by Holding, which previously had not been available
to Railroad. The Third Circuit held, however, that the reorgan-
ization was not within the scope of section 10(b).
What is unclear from the Third Circuit's opinion is
whether a single company recapitalization could ever trigger
rule 10b-5. At some points the language of the court indicates
that a significant alteration in the rights of the shareholder
would be a purchase or sale within the meaning of rule 10b-5.49
In other passages, however, the opinion seems to characterize
all recapitalizations as "internal corporate restructuring,"
which does not constitute a purchase or sale within rule 10b-
5.50
In a subsequent case, Schnorbach v. Fuqua,5' the plain-
tiffs attempted to distinquish Penn Central and to convince the
" Id. at 1338.
4' Id. at 1337.
46 Id.
4 Id. at 1338.
' Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 534, 537.
Id. at 538, 539.
70 F.R.D. 424 (S.D. Ga. 1975).
[Vol. 66
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court that a reverse stock split was a sale within the meaning
of rule 10b-5. Under the terms of the exchange, each owner of
100 shares of 10 cents par value common stock would exchange
for 1 share of $10 par value common stock. The court held,
however, that the plaintiffs did not "establish that FTI was
changed sufficiently after the Plan of Recapitalization to con-
stitute, in effect, a 'new' entity analogus to a corporation sur-
viving a merger." 52
In at least one case, Ingenito v. Bernec Corp.,53 a court
indicated that a recapitalization is within rule 10b-5 if the
altered rights are significant. In Ingenito the court stated:
Without attempting to define the precise contours of a §
10(b) event, we find that threshold § 10(b) jurisdiction is
established where, as here, there is alleged a substantial mod-
ification of an investment contract creating fresh rights and
obligations of the parties and the investor gives some consid-
eration, either a promise of future payments or the relin-
quishment of a significant right. 4
Obviously, the cases just mentioned are not conclusive.
Although Ingenito clearly states that "substantial modifica-
tions" of shareholder rights are sales, the language of the Penn
Central cases and the Schnorbach case seems to limit the con-
cept of purchase or sale to situations in which new assets are
added to the company. Nevertheless, it seems clear that any
significant alteration of a shareholder's rights should be
deemed a sale under rule 10b-5.
First, there is substantial authority supporting such a posi-
tion.55 In addition to the Ingenito case, it appears that the
52 Id. at 439.
376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Id. at 1182. Unfortunately, the value of the Ingenito case as precedent is limited
by the unique investment contract involved in the case. The plaintiffs had purchased
cattle with the sellers (defendants) providing certain maintenance services. It was the
alteration of these maintenance contracts that generated the litigation. Thus, drawing
factual analogies from Ingenito to the more usual alteration of a right of a shareholder
is difficult.
6 In addition to the material cited in the text, there is other authority supporting
the notion that significant recapitalizations are sales of securities. The most helpful
case is SEC v. Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 24 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), in which
the court held that the alteration of the maturity date of a debt security was a sale
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and consequently required compliance
with the registration provisions of that act. Both U.S. v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th
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position of the Securities and Exchange Commission is that
such alterations do constitute a sale. 6 Also, one cannot ignore
the authority under the 1933 Act in which it appears plain that
such alterations of significant rights involve a sale of securi-
ties.57 Finally, the analogy provided by the merger cases lends
significant support to the notion that recapitalizations are sales
under rule 10b-5.5 8
Beyond the weight of precedent, there are other compel-
ling reasons for defining a recapitalization as within the con-
straints of rule 10b-5. To do so would, for example, provide a
remedy for persons harmed by nondisclosure and misstate-
ments that occur in connection with a recapitalization. With-
out such a remedy, innocent shareholders who have approved
a recapitalization because of misstatements and nondisclosure
would be denied relief and thus would be treated unfairly.
This notion can best be demonstrated by an example. As-
sume that X corporation has a capital structure consisting of
common and preferred stock. The preferred stock has an an-
nual dividend of $2 per share plus the right to share equally
with the common shareholders all earnings in excess of the
amount necessary to satisfy the fixed $2 dividend. Further,
preferred has a liquidation preference of $100. X's board of
directors decides it would be advantageous to the common
shareholders to stop sharing the excess profits with the pre-
ferred, because management anticipates a significant increase
in income. In order to obtain the necessary vote of the preferred
shareholders, management of X decides to increase the liquida-
tion preference to $150 and states that because X has lost its
Cir. 1946) and World Wide Energy Ltd. [1971.72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 78,648, are somewhat confusing and therefore limited in value. Professor Loss
had indicated that, at least under the 1933 Act, the alteration of significant parts of
the shareholders' contracts would be a sale of a security. 1 L. Loss, supra note 38, at
514. Another author has stated, however, that "[a]n amendment changing stockhold-
ers' rights does not constitute a purchase or sale." A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RuLE lob-
5, § 117.02, at 5051 (1974).
" In response to a no-action request, the Staff of the Division of Corporation
Finance of the SEC "was unable to conclude that a new security is not being offered"
when a company amends its articles so as to make non-voting securities voting. First
Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am., 382 SEC. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) C-1 (Dec. 15, 1976).
See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the 1933 Act.
See notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the merger
cases.
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largest customer, liquidiation of X is a real possibility. In fact,
X has not lost its largest customer and has just signed a con-
tract with another large customer, which greatly increases the
projected earnings of X.
If the preferred shareholders approve this recapitalization,
it is difficult to conclude that preferred shareholders should be
denied recovery under rule 10b-5. Clearly, there is a need to
allocate fairly any loss that the preferred 'shareholders suffer
because of the misstatements of management. It seems mani-
festly unfair to deny preferred shareholders the right to a rem-
edy under rule 10b-5 if the misstatements resulted in the ap-
proval of a recapitalization unfavorable to preferred sharehold-
ers. The innocent preferred shareholders should not bear that
loss.
In addition to insuring a proper allocation of loss, the
availability of rule 10b-5 would have a second and somewhat
related beneficial effect on recapitalizations. Because a corpo-
ration (and its management) would incur liability under rule
10b-5 for failure to disclose any material information about the
recapitalization, the rule would encourage the disclosure of in-
formation to the preferred shareholders and thus insure that
they have available the information essential to make an in-
formed investment decision. Obviously, responsible manage-
ment and corporate counsel engaged in the recapitalization
would exercise care to disclose all material inside information.
In light of the power and politics of the recapitalization,
this forced disclosure is signficant. As was earlier mentioned,
the preferred shareholders are somewhat at the mercy of the
more powerful common shareholders in a recapitalization pro-
ceeding. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the pre-
ferreds usually will not have access to the same information
about the company as will the commons who are proposing the
recapitalization. As a result, the corporation (which seems to
be a euphemism for the common shareholders) could combine
a display of power with a failure to disclose material informa-
tion in order to cudgel and cajole the preferreds out of their
rights. Although forced disclosure would not diminish the raw
power of the commons, the accuracy of the corporate picture
presented to preferreds could make them more tenacious in
rebargaining their rights. Referring to the previous hypotheti-
cal, the preferreds would realize that liquidation is not a signif-
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icant danger and that the earnings outlook for the company is
much improved. Obviously that information would be signifi-
cant in deciding which terms of the rebargain the preferreds
would be willing to accept.
In summary, any single company recapitalization that sig-
nificantly alters the rights of shareholders should be deemed a
purchase or sale of securities and fall accordingly within the
protection of rule 10b-5. Such an approach would be consistent
with at least some precedent and would help ameloriate the
power disparity present in most recapitalizations.
II. MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS AND NONDISCLOSURES
As was discussed in the foregoing section, the application
of rule 10b-5 to recapitalizations would forbid the use of mate-
rial misstatements and nondisclosures in connection with man-
agement's attempt to secure the necessary votes to effect a
recapitalization. Its practical effect would be to force any com-
pany attempting to rebargain the significant rights of its pre-
ferred shareholders to take steps reasonably calculated59 to in-
sure that all preferred shareholders have all material informa-
tion about the particular transaction. Absent such action, the
company would risk a violation of rule 10b-5.
Since a company would be liable only to disclose facts
which are "material," the impact of rule 10b-5 is limited by the
definition of materiality. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 0 the Supreme Court apparently settled the dispute over
the definition of materiality" by holding: "[A]n omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote. 612 The problem, of course, is applying this rather general
norm to a particular recapitalization.63
" As a legal matter, merely unreasonable conduct on the part of the company
would not be a basis for 10b-5 liability after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976), which rejected negligence as a sufficient basis for recovery under rule 10b-
5. Sound counsel, however, would cause issuers to use reasonable care in disclosing all
material facts.
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
SI Compare Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973)
and Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1974) with TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975).
62 426 U.S. at 449.
It should be noted that the TSC Industries case was decided under rule 14a-9
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Engaging in extensive discussion of factual patterns which
may be material in various recapitalizations is beyond the
scope of this article. However, in order to demonstrate the
value of applying rule 10b-5 to recapitalizations it is necessary
at least to describe briefly examples of the types of disclosures
which would be necessitated by the rule.
In a recapitalization, a shareholder decides whether to sur-
render an existing bundle of rights (the give-up) in exchange
for a new bundle of rights (the receipt). Accordingly, any fact
that significantly affects the value of either the give-up or the
receipt should be deemed material and should be disclosed by
the company to shareholders voting on the recapitalization.
Clearly, then, facts that have a significant impact on corporate
income would be material and should be made available to the
shareholder." For example, the preferred shareholders of X cor-
poration may be presented with a proposal to alter the dividend
preferences and cumulative rights of their preferred stock. Be-
cause those provisions are designed to provide protection for
the preferreds in times of economic stress, the preferred share-
holders would need to know the company's economic outlook
in order to determine intelligently whether the exchange is ad-
vantageous. If the outlook for the company is gloomy, the
shareholder may be reluctant to surrender such protections; if
the outlook is bright, the value of such rights is diminished.
Another fact that would seem to be material in most recap-
italizations would be a change in the asset value of the corpora-
tion, 5 since it can have a significant impact on the value of
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although that rule applies only to the solicita-
tion of proxies from securities registered under the 1934 Act, the elements necessary
for recovery under rule 14a-9 and rule 10b-5 are similar. See, e.g., Mills v. Elec. Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (involving rule 14a-9) and Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (involving rule 10b-5). See also Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the Second
Circuit used 10b-5 definitions to decide a case under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
" There are a number of examples of facts that may affect the income of a corpora-
tion and thus be deemed material. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968); Ganigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965). Cf. 1 A. BROMBERG,
SEcumrIEs LAW: FRAuD § 7.4(4)(b) (1971) (materiality of corporate acquisitions and
their impact on the value of the corporation).
,4 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973)
(involving § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, but the court followed the principles developed
under rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of violations); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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both the give-up and the receipt. For example, to the extent
that the asset value of a corporation is substantial, a liquida-
tion preference in a preferred shareholder's contract provides
real protection because it permits a preferred shareholder to
recognize value even in the face of the economic failure of the
corporation. Therefore, in order to evaluate whether a surren-
dered or altered liquidation preference is significant, the share-
holder needs to know the real value of the assets underlying the
preference. Without such information a preferred shareholder
who believes that there are insufficient assets to cover his liqui-
dation preference may concede a portion of that preference.
Quite obviously, the preferred shareholder would be less willing
to concede part of his liquidation preference if there were real
assets sufficient to satisfy the preference.
In addition to factors that indicate the company has cer-
tain earning capabilities or asset value, there are other types
of disclosures that would have to be made by the company if
rule 10b-5 were deemed applicable to statutory recapitaliza-
tions. Any manifestations of the value of either the give-up or
the receipt that are inconsistent with the proposed exchange
and that are known to management should be revealed to the
voting shareholders.6 Thus, for example, if the management
has unsuccessfully attempted to place the new securities at the
price of fifty dollars but values them at seventy-five dollars for
the purposes of the exchange, failure to reveal the attempted
placement of the stock may be the nondisclosure of a material
fact that could generate 10b-5 liability.
These examples are not exhaustive of the type of disclo-
sure that must be made under rule 10b-5. They are sufficient
to demonstrate, however, the value of applying rule 10b-5 to
recapitalizations. If management were permitted to propose a
recapitalization plan without adequate disclosure of material
facts, preferred shareholders might unintentionally approve a
plan that is contrary to their self-interest. Requiring the disclo-
sure of all material facts surrounding a recapitalization will
benefit preferred shareholders by providing them with the in-
" Childs v. RIC Group, Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,333 (D. Ga. 1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
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formation necessary to make an informed judgment about the
recapitalization.
Beyond enabling the preferred shareholders to make an
informed judgment, forcing complete disclosures in a recapital-
ization may have another related beneficial effect. It may give
the otherwise disadvantaged preferred shareholders additional
clout to counter the advances of the common shareholders. To
the extent that management is required to disclose facts indi-
cating that the recapitalization is unfair, preferred sharehold-
ers will be less willing to accept the bargain. Thus, for example,
it will be more difficult for the corporation to obtain the pre-
ferreds' consent to lower their liquidation preference if manage-
ment is required to reveal that there are sufficient assets avail-
able to satisfy the present, larger liquidation preference and
that management intends to liquidate as soon as the liquida-
tion preference is altered.
III. RULE 10b-5 AND FAIRNESS
Notwithstanding the fact that the rule 10b-5 disclosure
requirements may give the preferred shareholders the informa-
tion necessary to make an informed judgment and may also
provide them with some facts to use in the bargaining process,
the common shareholders and their surrogates still possess the
raw power to extract substantial concessions from the pre-
ferred. As a practical matter, the scattered and unorganized
preferred shareholders have little chance to repel the advances
of the organized, well-financed and powerful common share-
holders." It is difficult for preferred shareholders to reject a
plan of recapitalization proffered by management in situations
where management recommends the plan and implicitly (or
perhaps explicitly) threatens to limit dividends if the plan is
not approved."
History indicates that this opportunity for advantage has
not escaped the watchful eye of the common shareholders. Es-
pecially in times of economic stress"9 and in periods of cyclical
7 See BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CoRPoRATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 210 n.v
(1972).
" Dodd, supra note 12; Brudney, supra note 13.
N Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Matteson v.
Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
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business changes, 0 management has been inclined to propose
and effectuate recapitalizations involving substantial share-
holder rights.7 1 Importantly, these proposed recapitalizations
have come at times when the particular provision that is the
subject of the recapitalization proposal provides needed protec-
tion for the preferred shareholder. Thus, for example, in
Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc.,72 an alteration of the pre-
ferred's liquidation right was proposed at the very time that
liquidation was a distinct reality for Postal. Similarly, in
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker,73 management proposed a re-
capitalization eliminating accrued dividends and making the
preferred stock non-cumulative. This was done because there
were large dividend arrearages owed to the preferred and those
arrearages were preventing the common shareholders from en-
joying the benefits of the increased income of the company.
In light of the power disparities between the common and
preferred shareholders and in view of the common sharehold-
ers' propensity to exploit that disparity, it is clear that some
limit should be imposed on the power of the common share-
holders to extract concessions from the disadvantaged pre-
ferred shareholders. Unhappily, neither the state legislatures
nor the state courts have imposed any meaningful constraints
on recapitalizations.
State legislatures have imposed certain procedural re-
quirements on the recapitalization mechanism, 74 including the
requirement that the majority of the affected shares approve
the recapitalization. Although these procedural protections af-
70 Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943); Western
Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39
N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949).
1, Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1976); Hottenstein v.
York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943); Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56
F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D.
Del. 1943); Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Porges v.
Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148 (Del. 1943); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85
N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948);
Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949); Franzblau v. Capital Sec.
Co., 64 A.2d 644 (N.J. 1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 214 (N.J.
1944); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J. Ch. 1943); Zobel v. American
Locomotive Co., 44 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1943); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport,
R.I., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1969).
72 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943).
85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949).
71 E.g., MBCA §§ 58-60 (1974).
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ford some relief to the preferred shareholders, the remedy is
partial at best. At the heart of the problem is the power dis-
parity between the common shareholders and the preferred
shareholders, and there is no rule forbidding the coercion of the
preferred shareholders by common shareholders." Accordingly,
the common shareholders can use their advantageous political
position to force preferred shareholders to vote for a recapitali-
zation that is contrary to their best interests; this, of course,
neutralizes any protection afforded by voting requirements.
In considering the absence of any legislative protection, it
is also important to recall that shareholders who have their
preferred contract altered in a recapitalization usually do not
have the right to dissent and exercise appraisal rights.76 Al-
though there is debate as to the effectiveness of appraisal
rights,77 such rights do permit the dissenting shareholder to
obtain "fair value" for his securities and would seem to put at
least some pressure on the common shareholders to give a rea-
sonably fair bargain to the preferred shareholders.
It is also unfortunate that courts have not filled this hiatus
in legislative protection by imposing any meaningful equitable
constraints on the rebargaining process. Relying more on politi-
cal predilection than on cogent reasoning, courts generally have
held that recapitalization plans meet the state norms of fair-
15 The exception to this is NEB. Ray. STAT. § 21-2059 (1974), which states:
In case of any proposed amendment of the articles of incorporation changing
the existing priority rights, or provisions of any class of shares outstanding,
a shareholder adversely affected may apply to any court of competent juris-
diction to restrain and enjoin the corporation from adopting such amend-
ment on the ground of fraud or unfairness. On the filing of such application
the court shall, upon notice to all shareholders, hold a hearing upon the issue
of the alleged fraud or unfairness of the proposed amendment, at which all
shareholders shall have the right to appear and produce evidence. After such
hearing the court shall enjoin the proposed amendment if the proponents fail
to show that, to a reasonable probability, it is fair, just, and equitable to all
shareholders affected thereby.
It is interesting that in its more than 25 years of existence, this statute has never been
construed and has never served as more than the basis for comment by scholars. See,
e.g., Brudney, supra note 13, at 457 n.32; BRUDNEY AND CWRELSTEIN, supra note 67.
7, For example, there is no such right under the Model Act.
Compare Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-29, 260-61 (1962) with Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of
Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decision-Making, 57 CAUF. L.
REV. 1, 71-74, 84-86 (1969).
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ness.78 These decisions are often based on reasons that border
on the absurd79 and are often rendered in the face of rather clear
evidence that the exchange ratio was uneven." Even in those
situations where courts have enjoined the recapitalizations,8'
the analyses often become so clouded that it is difficult to
determine exactly which theory the court is applying. 2 Some
courts even have gone so far as to enjoin a recapitalization on
an apparent technicality in order to avoid making the difficult
decision of whether the recapitalization met the fairness test. 3
Thus, there is no effective state mechanism (either legisla-
tive or judicial) available to protect preferred shareholders
from an unfair alteration in their preferred stock contract. It
becomes apparent, then, that one must look elsewhere for con-
straints that can protect the preferred shareholders from the
power of the common shareholders.
The availability of rule 10b-5 as a remedy for unfairness
has been the subject of scholarly comment84 and court deci-
sions'8 5 although no court has ever applied the concept directly
to recapitalizations. Rather, the concept has been applied in
78 Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Goldman v.
Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39
N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949); Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 64 A.2d 644 (N.J. 1949); Bove
v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Matteson v.
Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
" In Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1l. 1949), the elimination of
accumulated dividends was held to be fair, apparently because the plan was over-
whelmingly approved by preferred shareholders, there was no earned surplus out of
which dividends could have been paid and the common shareholders had sacrificed
50% of the par value of their shares. Id. at 722-23.
10 Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Dratz v. Occiden-
tal Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025
(Wash. 1952).
It is probable that most recapitalizations altering any substantial right of the
preferred shareholder are motivated by a desire on the part of common shareholders
to acquire part of the value of the preferred shareholder. See Dodd, supra note 12, at
783-84, where he states, "Usually the primary motive for such recapitalizations is not
to facilitate new issues of common shares but to improve the prospect of dividends for
the holders of the existing common shares."
1, E.g., Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J. Ch. 1943).
82 E.g., State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948); Wessel v.
Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch. 1944).
11 Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (I, 1959).
9 Sherrard, Fiduciaries and Fairness Under Rule 10b-5, 29 VAND. L. Rav. 1385
(1976).
81 E.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
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the context of companies that are going private,8 selling 7 or
exchanging88 their own securities at unfair prices, or merging
with another company.89 Prior to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,9" the lower federal courts could not agree as to whether
rule 10b-5 was a fairness constraint in the context of a purchase
or sale of securities. Some courts held that unfairness alone was
sufficient to violate rule 10b-5, 11 while other courts demanded
that there must be some deception (i.e., some misstatement or
nondisclosure of material facts) in order for the rule to be vio-
lated .
2
At least on the surface, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,93 appears to have resolved this dispute. In that case,
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. (Santa Fe) merged with its subsidiary
Kirby Lumber Company (Kirby). Because Santa Fe owned
ninety-five percent of the stock of Kirby the merger was ef-
fected as a short form merger under applicable Delaware law, 4
and the minority shareholders of Kirby were offered $150 per
share of common stock. Although under state law there were
appraisal rights available to the dissenting shareholders, the
minority shareholders of Kirby did not pursue that remedy.
Instead, they sought a remedy under rule 10b-5, alleging that
the merger was undertaken for the purpose of freezing out the
minority interest in Kirby at a wholly inadequate price. Sig-
nificantly, the case came to the Supreme Court "on the prem-
ise that the complaint failed to allege a material misrepresen-
" Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 881
(1976).
17 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1964).
U O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
U Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
- 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S.
881 (1976).
11 Marsh v. Amanda Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,496 (1976); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339
F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
,3 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
DEL. CODE § 253 (1974).
'3 DEL. CODE § 262 (1974).
" 430 U.S. at 467.
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tation or material failure to disclose, 9 7 and thus the case
squarely presented the question of whether a plaintiff had a
remedy under rule 10b-5 for a merger that was unfair in its
terms.
The Supreme Court denied relief under rule 10b-5. The
Court held that recovery under rule 10b-5 was limited by the
language of the underlying statute, section 10(b) of the 1934
Act. Because that statute only addresses situations wherein the
use of a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" is
involved, the Court stated that "the claim of a fraud and fidu-
ciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under
any part of rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly
viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of
the statute.""
The Court was unable to find any conduct that could be
considered "deceptive" since the case came to them on the
premise that the complaint did not allege material misrepre-
sentation or material failure to disclose. Further, the Court
held that there had not been sufficient allegations of
"manipulative" conduct. After describing manipulation as
"virtually a term of art," the Court limited the scope of that
term "to practices . . . that are intended to mislead investors
by artifically affecting market activity."99 Because the freeze-
out did not create such activity, the Court held that there was
no manipulation within the meaning of section 10(b).
Although Green holds that unfairness alone does not vio-
late rule 10b-5, this writer is convinced that the disclosure
requirements of rule 10b-5 provide substantial protection from
unfair recapitalizations and, further, provide remedies for the
preferred shareholder who is cudgled into accepting an unfair
bargain. While these disclosure requirements do not impose
exact standards of fairness, they do establish parameters of
general fairness that can protect the preferred shareholders
from the substantial concessions they often are required to
make in a recapitalization.
17 Id. at 474.
"Id.
" Id. at 476. Six of the Justices joined in Part IV of the decision, in which other
reasons for not extending rule 10b-5 were cited. Id. at 477-80. These appear to be dicta,
since the Court admitted that "[t]he language of the statute is. .. 'sufficiently clear
in its context' to be dispositive here . . . ." Id. at 476.
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Briefly, the analysis supporting such a remedy is as fol-
lows: The application of rule 10b-5 to recapitalizations requires
that there be no material nondisclosures or misstatements
made to shareholders in connection with a proposed recapitali-
zation. It would be a material misstatement if management
proposed a recapitalization and represented to the shareholders
that it was "fair" when the terms of the recapitalization were,
in fact, unfair to preferred shareholders. Even if management
were able to refrain from opining as to the fairness of the terms
of the exchange, rule 10b-5 might still be violated if a recapital-
ization that were substantially unfair were presented to share-
holders, since the board of directors in proposing the recapitali-
zation implicitly represents that the terms are fair. Accord-
ingly, whenever the board of directors of a corporation proposes
a recapitalization, the board will, either directly or by implica-
tion, opine as to the fairness of the terms of the recapitaliza-
tion. To the extent that the terms are unfair, therefore, there
has been a misstatement that should be actionable under rule
10b-5 (if, of course, the other elements of the action are pres-
ent). This analysis, however, requires extensive explanation.
Under the Model Business Corporation Act, an alteration
of the rights of preferred shareholders requires that the board
of directors authorize the proposed amendment to the articles
and then submit that proposal to the shareholders for their
approval. ' If the board of directors represents to the share-
holders that the particular exchange is "fair" when, in fact, the
exchange ratio is unfair, that would be a material misstate-
ment and, accordingly, a violation of rule 10b-5.
In Bowman v. Armour & Co.,"0 ' the directors adopted a
resolution that changed the redemption rights of preferred
shareholders from the right to receive $115 plus accrued and
unpaid dividends to the right to receive one $120 principal
value debenture and one stock warrant. The company indi-
cated that the alteration in the redemption right would be
followed by a redemption of the preferred stock, and thus the
preferred shares were, in effect, exchanged for a debenture and
a warrant. It appears in that case that the fair value of the
" MBCA § 59 (1974).
,' Unreported case from the Superior Court of Cook County (1959), rev'd, 160
N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1959).
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debenture and warrant may have been 20% less than the value
of the preferred stock.'12 Accordingly, it would have been a
material misstatement for management to state that the recap-
italization was "fair," since the disparity between the give-up
and the receipt was substantial. Such a material misstatement
should be actionable under rule 10b-5.
There are at least two ways a corporation engaged in an
unfair recapitalization may attempt to protect itself from lia-
bility under rule 10b-5. The first is to disclose all basic informa-
tion about the company and the proposed recapitalization. If
management then urges adoption of the unfair plan and states
that the plan is "fair," it could be argued that any reliance by
preferred shareholders on management's statement would be
unjustifiable. Because any plaintiff that unjustifiably relies on
a misstatement is barred from recovery under rule 10b-5,'13
arguably management could limit its exposure under the rule
by massive factual disclosure.
It seems clear, however, that such disclosures should not
bar a plaintiffs recovery under rule 10b-5. Notwithstanding
the availability of contradictory factual information that may
be supplied to preferred shareholders, management's recom-
mendation of fairness could have an impact on a reasonable
shareholder's decision to approve the recapitalization. First,
management has an inside position, access to information that
may not be readily available to shareholders, and an instinct
for the future of the company. Because of this, management's
statements of fairness may have special significance for share-
holders. In addition, while one may wish to debate the question
of whether management technically owes a fiduciary duty to
the preferred shareholders, °4 it is clear that preferred share-
'02 Bowman v. Armour & Co. is reproduced in BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE
FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 178 (1972). The statement that the discrepancy in value
between the debentures and the preferred stock was about 20% is based on information
reported by the authors. Id. at 185.
103 For a discussion of the requirement that the plaintiff must rely justifiably on
the defendant's misstatement in order to be able to recover under rule 10b-5, see
Campbell, Elements of Recovery under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's
Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 U. S.C. L. REv. 653 (1975).
I" A recent Delaware case stated directly that "those who control the corporate
machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the minority in the exercise thereof over corporate
power and property." Singer v. Magnavox Company, 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. Supr.
1977).
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holders have entrusted their funds to management and have a
reasonable expectation that management will faithfully guard
their interests in the corporation. To the extent that manage-
ment does not fulfill this expectation, preferred shareholders
usually can sue derivatively to enforce their rights."0 5 These
expectations reasonably generate credibility for management's
recommendation of fairness, even if that recommendation
could not be supported by the data provided the shareholders.
In short, management's inside position and special relationship
to preferred shareholders combine to justify a shareholder's
reliance on management's representation of "fairness" (not-
withstanding the fact that a sophisticated analysis of the basic
information supplied to the shareholders would expose the un-
fairness).
Additionally, it is not clear that merely negligent conduct
by a plaintiff will bar his recovery under rule 10b-5. Because
the Hochfelder case held that merely negligent conduct by a
defendant is not actionable under rule 10b-5,1°1 some courts"'7
and commentators" 8 have indicated that a plaintiff who is
merely negligent should not be barred from recovery. To hold
otherwise, it is thought, would cause the loss to fall on the less
blameworthy party, since a plaintiff who was merely negligent
would then be barred from recovering from a defendant who
intentionally misstated facts. If, therefore, even a negligent
plaintiff will still be permitted to recover, it will be even more
difficult to bar a plaintiff who relies on management's opinion
of fairness, since such reliance would, at most, be classified as
negligence.
Another technique available to protect management from
a 10b-5 claim in a recapitalization situation involves the use of
an outside and independent analyst to express his opinion as
to the fairness of the exchange ratio. Under the Hochfelder
Traditional corporate lore is that management owes a fiduciary duty to the corpo-
ration, which can be enforced by shareholders in a derivative action. Some acts by
management, however, can result in direct suits by shareholders against management.
See N. LArIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONs 272-315, 410-63 (2d ed. 1971).
Wn Typically, statutes dealing with the right to bring derivative suits do not distin-
guish between preferred and common shareholders. E.g., MBCA § 49.
'" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
'' Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d
687 (10th Cir. 1976).
I" Campbell, supra note 103, at 664-69.
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case,'0 ' the Supreme Court held that there could be no recovery
under rule 10b-5 for conduct of the defendant that was merely
negligent. In the recapitalization situation, therefore, a plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the declaration of fairness by the
management was made with a degree of culpability in excess
of negligence. If the management of a company engaged in a
recapitalization hires a reputable investment banker willing to
opine that the exchange ratio is fair,"' that opinion may effec-
tively insulate management from any claim that the degree of
culpability required under Hochfelder was met. In that situa-
tion it probably would be difficult to prove that management's
opinion of fairness, if based on the analysis of an expert invest-
ment banker, could even be classified as negligent. Clearly, it
would not meet the standard of recklessness or intent necessary
to satisfy Hochfelder.1'
In light of this, there is the possibility that a clever and
aggressive management may shop around until it finds a firm
that is willing to give the opinion desired by management as
to the fairness of the particular recapitalization. An example
of this is found in Levin v. The Great Western Sugar Co., 11 2
which involved a merger between two affiliated companies. In
that case, the terms of a merger were submitted to Dillon, Read
& Co. for an opinion as to the fairness of the terms of the
merger. Dillon was unable to state that the merger'was fair and
equitable to certain shareholders, so management simply hired
Kidder, Peabody & Company, which was able to approve the
,o Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
", The procedure of obtaining professional advice in the computation of exchange
ratios is common in merger cases. For example, in the now famous case of Mills v. Elec.
Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the plan of merger and the exchange ratio was
submitted to Standard Research Consultants, which is a subsidiary of Standard and
Poor's Corporation. Because that firm was able to opine that the particular merger was
fair and equitable to the Electric Autolite shareholders, the proxy material of Electric
Autolite stated: "The Board of Directors of Electric Autolite believes the plan of mer-
ger to be fair and equitable to the shareholders of Electric Autolite. ... This proxy
statement is reprinted in W. CARY, 1976 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 6 (4th ed. 1969). -
"I Although the Court in Hochfelder clearly held that negligence was not action-
able under rule 10b-5, the Court specifically reserved the question of whether reck-
lessness is sufficient for a recovery under rule 10b-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
112 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1969).
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merger after some alteration in the terms."'
One should not imagine, however, that the availability of
alternate analysts enables management to obtain outlandish
opinons. At least if management stays with reputable invest-
ment banking houses, the difference in the recommended ex-
change ratios among the analysts may not vary significantly.
114
The Levin case demonstrates the limits within which manage-
ment may find itself while searching for a favorable opinion. In
Levin, Dillon, Read & Co. refused to recommend the fairness
of a ratio giving the particular shareholder 3/10 of a share of
common stock and one share of preferred paying $1.75 per year.
Dillon did conclude, however, that "it was in the ball park."1
5
The subsequent approval of the plan by Kidder, Peabody
occurred only after the company had increased the amount of
common received to 1/3 share and increased the dividend on
the preferred to $1.87. Since the earlier offer was deemed to
be "in the ball park" by Dillon, obviously the second offer
must have been even closer.
Levin would indicate, therefore, that there may not be
substantial differences among the exchange ratios that differ-
ent analysts recommend as fair. Because reputable investment
banking firms could incur liability for outlandish opinions as
to value and because the firms take pride in their professional
reputations, the ratios recommended as "fair" by such firms
should be reliable and thus provide protection for the preferred
shareholders. As a result, management, in some attempt to
insulate itself from 10b-5 liability, may inadvertently engage in
a procedure that militates against unfairness to preferred.
shareholders in the rebargaining process.
If management recommends an exchange as fair and does
not utilize an investment banking firm, the application of rule
10b-5 is more direct; consequently, management's exposure to
liability would probably increase. In this situation, a recom-
mendation from management that the exchange is "fair"
should be considered a material misstatement if the exchange
I" Even with this change, Dillon, Read was unable to opine as to the fairness of
the exchange.
"I Obviously, it is difficult to find support for the statement that reputable invest-
ment banking firms probably would not vary significantly in the exchange ratios they
would recommend as fair. There is agreement with this proposition among the very
few lawyers this author consulted who were familiar with this area.
"I Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 406 F.2d at 1115.
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ratio is substantially unfair. There would be liability under rule
10b-5 if the plaintiff could show that the recommendation as
to the fairness was made with sufficient culpability to satisfy
Hochfelder. "I
Although Hochfelder held that mere negligence on the part
of the defendant was not sufficient for recovery under rule 10b-
5, such a standard would not completely insulate management.
Management would not be safe recommending a recapitaliza-
tion as fair when the exchange ratio is patently unfair, since
inferences of culpability could arise from such action. As the
disparity between the value of the give-up and the receipt in-
creases, it would be difficult for management to establish that
its representations of fairness were merely negligent. Again,
therefore, although rule 10b-5 may not enforce exact standards
of fairness, it may establish limits that protect preferred share-
holders from substantially unfair recapitalizations.
Management may attempt to contain its liability under
rule 10b-5 by refraining from making any representations of
fairness concerning its proposed recapitalization. It is unclear,
however, whether such defensive tactics could protect manage-
ment if the proposed recapitalization were in fact unfair. In the
first place, it may be difficult for management to refrain from
making some representations about the fairness of the ex-
change at some time during the alteration process. Even if
management did not make explicit statements as to fairness in
the proxy solicitation material (or perhaps even refrained from
soliciting proxies at all) it would be difficult for management
to avoid some discussion and defense of its proposal at the
shareholders' meeting called to approve the plan of recapitali-
zation.
Even in the unlikely event that management could avoid
making direct statements as to the fairness of the terms of the
recapitalization, it is not clear that management could effec-
tively avoid liability under rule 10b-5. Under the Model Act a
recapitalization, whether accomplished by an amendment to
the articles of incorporation' 7 or by a merger into a dummy
corporation, 1 8 requires that the board of directors adopt a reso-
It 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
"1 MBCA § 59 (1974).
I MBCA § 71 (1974).
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lution approving the recapitalization and submit that resolu-
tion to the shareholders for their approval. As discussed earlier,
both the management and the board of directors of a corpora-
tion have a special relationship with the shareholders, and this
relationship generates some duty to protect the interests of the
preferred shareholders. In light of this fact, preferred share-
holders who are the subject of a recapitalization should be
permitted to indulge in the presumption that the recapitaliza-
tion proposed by the board of directors is fair. Thus when the
board of directors "adopt[s] a resolution setting forth the pro-
posed amendment and . . . direct[s] that it be submitted to
a vote of a meeting of shareholders,""' 9 the reasonable presump-
tion, especially in light of the duties owed to the shareholders
by the board of directors, is that the particular proposal is fair.
To the extent that such a proposal is unfair and that unfairness
is not revealed to the shareholders, there is a misstatement or
nondisclosure within the meaning of rule 10b-5.
If the foregoing analysis is correct and the board of direc-
tors (by adopting a resolution recommending a particular re-
capitalization) implicitly certifies the exchange as fair, the
availability of rule 10b-5 as a constraint against an unfair ex-
change ratio would be the same as in the situation where a
direct statement of fairness has been made by management.
Therefore, if the plaintiff could demonstrate that manage-
ment's culpability is sufficient to satisfy the Hochfelder'0 stan-
dard, the plaintiff would be able to recover. As in the direct
misstatement situation, a substantially unfair exchange ratio
should be considered demonstrative of fault sufficient to come
within the Hochfelder criterion, since such a discrepancy
clearly implies that management knows such an exchange ratio
is unfair and thus inconsistent with its implied representation
of fairness.
Admittedly, it is this last part of the analysis that is most
difficult to defend, and at least one district court opinion seems
to reject the notion that management owes an obligation to
characterize certain transactions as unfair. In Goldberger v.
Baker, '' the plaintiff alleged that nondisclosures and misstate-
MBCA § 59(a) (1974).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
12 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REv. (CCH) 96,203.
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ments had been made in connection with certain securities
transactions. Specifically, the claim was that the company
failed to disclose that it had "received less than fair and ade-
quate consideration for . . [certain] loans.11 2 Further, there
were allegations that the company had failed to disclose that
other, prior transactions would "substantially damage" and
"decrease the earnings" of the corporation.'1
The court held that this complaint did not state a cause
of action, since "[i]t allege[d] only that the terms were unfair
S. .. To hold that such an allegation was sufficient would be
tantamount to asking defendants to 'characterize' the transac-
tions with 'pejorative' words, and the failure to use such de-
scriptions is not a 10b-5 violation."'2 4 Finally, the court stated
that the "[d]efendants cannot be liable for a mere failure to
say that their deal was a bad one. This also is not an adequate
allegation of deception under Rule lOb-5."' 25
In addition to Goldberger, one cannot avoid some consid-
eration of the recent trend of the Supreme Court, which has
been to constrict significantly the scope of rule 10b-5. Begin-
ning after its decision in the Affiliated Ute case,'16 the Court
has undertaken a substantial reduction in the coverage of the
securities laws in general, and rule 10b-5 in particular, and in
so doing seems to have developed the rule that the defendant
always wins.' 27 Accordingly, this entire analysis may be subject
to criticism as inconsistent with that trend.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which representations of
fairness have been considered significant by courts. For exam-
ple, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the Seventh Circuit
declared that it was materially misleading for management to
recommend a merger as "fair and equitable to the sharehold-
ers" when management failed to disclose that there was a con-
flict of interest.28 In Dennison Mines Ltd. v. Fiberboard
'2 Id. at p. 92,425.
123 Id.
12, Id. at p. 92,426.
"'2 Id. at p. 92,427.
M' Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), expanded rule
lOb-5 by holding that reliance could be presumed from materiality.
IV For a discussion of these cases, see Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
'M 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), remanded on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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Corp., ,29 another court held it misleading for management to
report that Lehman Brothers found a merger fair when it was
not revealed that Lehman's opinion was based on asset evalu-
taion that had been supplied by management and not indepen-
dently investigated by Lehman. Finally, in Tanzier v.
Haynie,'3 the plaintiffs claimed a violation of rule 10b-5 in
connection with a merger. Although the court held only that all
the allegations taken together stated a cause of action, the
court seemed especially interested in management's represen-
tation of fairness on the terms of the exchange. The court char-
acterized the plaintiffs' allegations as including an assertion of
"an array of deception and omissions that are alleged to have
rendered materially misleading defendants' repeated assur-
ances that the merger price was 'fair and equitable.' ",131 The
court stated that "where there is . . . an affirmative represen-
tation by fiduciaries that they have determined a price to be
fair and equitable, matters that otherwise might not have to be
disclosed may require airing." 132
While none of these cases is precisely on point with the
recapitalization situation, the cases do demonstrate that repre-
sentations of fairness have been considered important by courts
dealing with corporate reorganizations. In each case the court
seemed to assume that the representation had an impact on
shareholders and thus necessitated certain actions on the part
of management in order to dampen the deception of the state-
ments. Accordingly, these cases may be considered as preced-
ent for this writer's thesis, notwithstanding that the trend of
the Supreme Court is toward defining a limited role for rule
10b-5.
In addition to this precedent, at least some courts have not
abandoned rule 10b-5 as a remedy for the compelling case. An
example is Goldberg v. Meridor, ,3 3 a case in which the plaintiff,
who was a shareholder of Universal Gas & Oil Company
12 388 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1974).
' 405 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
' Id. at 654.
132 Id.
1" [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,162. There are
other cases in which lower federal courts have interpreted liberally the recent Supreme
Court decisions and trend. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033 (7th Cir. 1977) (recklessness is sufficient for recovery under rule 10b-5).
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(UGO), alleged that UGO sold stock to its parent company,
Maritimecor, for less than the fair value of the stock. One glar-
ing problem in plaintiffs 10b-5 theory, however, was identify-
ing the deception demanded by Green, since the board of direc-
tors of UGO was controlled by the parent, Maritimecor, and
thus knew of the undervaluation of the stock of UGO. The
court held, however, that the deception requirement of Green
could be satisfied by alleging deception on the shareholders of
UGO, even though those shareholders had no vote on or control
over the issuance of the stock to Maritimecor.3 4 It appears,
therefore, that at least some courts may be amenable to apply-
ing rule 10b-5 to compelling cases, even if the limits of Green
and the concept of deception must be stretched. '35
The strongest argument in favor of this writer's thesis is
not precedent, however. Rather, it is policy: There is a need to
ensure that shareholders who are presented with a proposed
recapitalization are given the sufficient, accurate, and intelligi-
ble information necessary to enable them to decide whether to
exchange their existing bundle of rights for a new bundle of
rights. In fact, this policy is the very essence of the Green
decision, since Green clearly recognized that rule 10b-5 is de-
signed to discourage material misstatements and nondisclo-
sures. Accordingly, any decision that encourages full and ac-
curate disclosures is consistent with the policy of rule 10b-5 as
interpreted in Green.
In charting the boundaries of rule 10b-5, courts should
accommodate the realities that exist in particular situations
and, accordingly, should discourage misstatements and non-
disclosures that realistically affect persons involved in securi-
ties transactions. If the management of a company involved in
a recapitalization states, "This recapitalization is fair," that
statement can have an impact on persons determining whether
to approve the recapitalization, and management should there-
fore be held accountable for that statement under rule 10b-5.
"I The court stated: "[W]e do not read Green as ruling that no action lies under
Rule 10b-5 when a controlling corporation causes a partly owned subsidiary to sell its
securities to the parent in an unfair transaction and fails to make a disclosure or, as
can be alleged here, makes a misleading disclosure." [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,162 at p. 92,265.
M For a similar decision in the Seventh Circuit, see Wright v. The Heizer Corp.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.'SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,101 (7th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 66
HeinOnline  -- 66 Ky. L.J. 298 1977-1978
VOLUNTARY RECAPITALIZATIONS
Even if management also discloses other material information
about the company and the terms of the exchange, still man-
agement should not be permitted to make such representations
of fairness with impunity, if the exchange ratio is substantially
unfair. To grant immunity for such misstatements would en-
courage management to propose an unfair exchange ratio and
to inundate the shareholders with reams of documents disclos-
ing all information about the company, accompanying this
with a short but prominent statement encouraging the share-
holder to approve the recapitalization since "it is fair to all
concerned and in the best interests of the company." Realisti-
cally, such actions by management would have an impact on
shareholders, who may well be baffled by the factual disclo-
sures and would rely on the representation of management,
who, after all, are charged with the duty of protecting the inter-
ests of shareholders.
There are also sound policy reasons why the management
of a company proposing an unfair recapitalization should be
forced to disclose the unfairness in direct terms and should not
be permitted to avoid liability merely by saying nothing. In
general terms, the most compelling reason is that such disclo-
sures would provide shareholders with meaningful information
on which to base their decision to accept or reject the proposed
recapitalization. It would be useful for shareholders involved in
a recapitalization to receive a statement from management
concerning the fairness of the proposed exchange. Although
other, more basic information would also be material to the
shareholders, clearly any shareholder would like to have man-
agement's objective and intelligible assessment of the fairness
of the recapitalization, since management's inside position
may give it certain instincts about the future of the company
that are not accurately reflected by raw data.
More importantly, however, one should not overlook the
fact that many shareholders simply cannot evaluate a prospec-
tus or other disclosure documents and determine whether a
particular exchange ratio is fair. Disclosures of raw data may
often be meaningless to shareholders, who have neither the
training nor the expertise necessary to determine the fairness
of the exchange proposed by management. It would be sound
policy to interpret rule 10b-5 in such a way as to encourage a
form of disclosure that is understandable to less sophisticated
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shareholders. It would therefore be helpful if management were
required to disclose in direct terms whether the recapitalization
is fair, since that is the type of disclosure that would aid many
shareholders in evaluating the recapitalization.
Incidentally, compelling management to make appropri-
ate disclosures about the fairness of a proposed recapitalization
would also have the beneficial effect of limiting management's
ability to extract unfair concessions from preferred share-
holders involved in a recapitalization. Any recapitalization
that is substantially unfair would require management to
state: "This recapitalization is unfair to preferred share-
holders." Obviously management would be reluctant to make
such a statement in connection with any proposed recapitali-
zation, since the chance of getting approval from the preferred
shareholders would be decreased and management could be
open to charges that state fairness constraints had been vio-
lated.
Realistically, therefore, management will probably defend
the recapitalization as "fair," or possibly management will
make no recommendation whatsoever concerning the recapital-
ization. In either event, however, management could be held
liable under rule 10b-5 if the terms of the recapitalization were
substantially unfair, since management's action would consti-
tute either an implicit or an explicit recommendation that the
merger is fair. Accordingly, rule 10b-5 would serve as a mecha-
nism to test the substantial fairness of the recapitalization.
CONCLUSION
State courts have been ineffective in protecting preferred
shareholders from the demands made by common shareholders
in the context of recapitalizations. The inability to constrain
common shareholders by the use of equitable notions is even
more unfortunate when one realizes that there are no appraisal
rights for the preferred shareholder who is presented with an
unfair recapitalization.
It appears, however, that rule 10b-5 does provide the pre-
ferred shareholder with significant protection from the unfair
recapitalization. At a minimum, the rule insures against ma-
terial misstatements and forces the management to disclose to
the preferred shareholders all material information about the
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recapitalization. While not a complete protection, this can pro-
vide the preferred shareholders with basic information about
the proposed exchange, which should make the preferred more
tenacious in refusing to make substantial concessions.
Additional and meaningful protection can be extended to
the disadvantaged preferred shareholders if courts are willing
to hold management liable for misstatements as to the fairness
of the recapitalization and for failures to disclose in direct
terms the unfairness of recapitalizations. This interpretation of
rule 10b-5 will protect preferred shareholders from misstate-
ments that, as a practical matter, have an impact on their
votes, and it will force management to make disclosures in a
form that is intelligible to shareholders. Finally, it may indi-
rectly enforce general standards of fairness in recapitalizations.
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